Editor’s note – the following is a summary of the recent hearing on motions pertaining to the Phyllis Agan trust court case. Earlier this year, a jury had ruled that the plaintiff’s claims that Agan was both not mentally competent to make her final changes to her trust fund and that undue influence had been exerted in the process of making these final trust fund amendments were not proven. The following motions were filed in Woodstock as a result of that determination.
Prepared by Peter J. LaBelle
On July 10, 2012 the judge in the case of Curran v. United Church, et. al. (the Phyllis Agan bequest case) held a hearing to allow both sides to argue the outstanding motions in the case. Once the judge rules on these motions the way should be clear for the losing party to appeal the case to the Vermont Supreme Court.
The first motion heard was a motion by the plaintiffs (the Currans) for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. Essentially they are asking the judge to overturn the jury’s verdict and to rule in their favor, or alternatively to grant them a new trial. Their argument rests largely on the judge’s earlier ruling that the burden of proof in the case had shifted from the plaintiffs to the defense because she saw “suspicious circumstances” in the execution of the Agan Trust. They argue that since she saw the suspicious circumstance and since, in their words, the defense produced no evidence to meet the burden of proof, the case should never have gone to the jury and the judge should have ruled in their favor. Therefore, she should reverse the jury verdict now. Or she should grant them a new trial.
The defense countered that substantial evidence was offered to meet the burden of proof – plaintiffs just choose to ignore it now. The jury had the opportunity to weigh all evidence and came to a conclusion based on the totality of the case. The judge should not disturb that conclusion.
The second motion heard was the defense motion for costs and attorney fees. Vermont adopted a law in 2009 that includes a section authorizing attorney fees to be paid from a trust to the winning party in some cases. The defense argued that under the statute the trust should pay the attorney fees and should pay interest on the judgment. Beyond the statute there are also cases in other states in which winning parties received attorney fees where a trust was involved. Also, since all defendants here are innocent parties – they were forced into litigation through no action of their own – equity calls for a ruling that the trust pay their attorneys.
The plaintiffs argued that the statute does not apply in this court or in this case and that the general rule applies that each party pay their own costs and fees.
The judge took both motions under advisement and said that she will issue a written opinion on each. It is expected that she will take several months to write her opinion.
